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dealing with VPNs consisting of large numbers 
1. Introduction of nodes, cost considerations play a significant 
role. In this paper we will examine ways whereby 
The predominance of the Internet has resulted in both small and large scale VPNs can be deployed 
unprecedented connectivity. Especially in cheaply and efficiently. 
developed countries, this means that, regardless 
of location, there is always a nearby connection 
to the Internet. In turn, this changes the 
economics behind the provisioning of closed 
networks, whether they are within a given 
company or organization, or linking different 
corporate entities. The cost of connecting to 
public networks decreases more rapidly than that 
of private networks (i.e., networks consisting of 
lea.sed lines or circuits) thus making financially 
more tempting going over the Internet rather than 
using a private network. Moreover, as 
consumers get higher speed connections to the 
Internet (via cable modems, high speed DSL 
lines, etc.) there is more pressure to use these 
links to telecornmute. In both cases the use of 
VPNs is obligatory to safeguard the participants 
from outside interference. 
A typical VPN configuration is shown in 
figure 1 where a number of LANs are linked to 
the public Internet. The intention is that the hosts 
in each LAN may communicate with hosts in all 
the other LANs but communication with the rest 
of the Internet should be restricted. This is 
achieved by providing each network with a node 
that implements the security policy of the VPN. 
This usually means that the node maintains 
secure tunnels (i.e. encrypted) with one or more 
remote networks and also acts as a firewall 
restricting connections with hosts outside the 
VPN. In the next section we discuss the 
requirements for such VPN nodes. Next, we 
describe our drop-in VPN node that is a 
hardwarelsoftware combination constructed by 
integrating existing open-source components. We 
In the first case, cost is not the dominant 
then pesent a VPN and discuss how 
our system copes with the requirements we have 
factor, but in the second one, where we are set. Finally we present comments on the design 
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Figure I. The VPN nodes are located between the network access device and the 
internal network 
and implementation of our system and our plans 
for future enhancements. 
2. Requirements 
A major decision in the design of a VPN node is 
whether it should be embedded in the access 
device that links the LAN to the public Internet 
or whether it should a standalone device that sits 
between the network access device and the LAN. 
The multitude of access technologies that are 
available today and the low cost of the popular 
access devices (router, cable modem, wireless 
bridge etc.) makes it very difficult to justify the 
embedded approach. While the addition of yet 
another box has some obvious disadvantages it 
does keep down the complexity of the VPN node 
and also allows us to provision a single device 
that is independent of the access technology used. 
Moreover, given the low cost of Ethernet 
adapters, our approach does not impose a 
significant cost penalty. 
The other requirements for the VPN node 
were as follows: 
Low cost, probably a single board com- 
puter (SBC) with two Ethernet ports. 
Minimal administrative overhead. This 
implies easy configuration and no 
administrator intervention after 
installation. Moreover, the bulk of the 
work for the construction of the 
software distribution for the network 
monitoring station should be devoted to 
integration of existing tools and 
packages, rather than the development 
of new code that would have to be 
maintained. 
Offer secure (encrypted) network 
connections with the other members of 
the VPN. 
Protect the VPN members from 
interference from the public Internet. 
Be resistant to tampering; in cases 
where there are indications that a station 
has been hacked, it must be easy to 
restore its original configuration. 
Offer a standard platform for the 
execution of common network 
management and monitoring tools. VPN 
users should not have access to the 
management information. 
Finally, regardless of the profile of the 
end user, the node must be able to be 
deployed with minimal overhead. The 
complexity of the creation of a VPN 
station configuration should not be 
greater than the preparation of a 
company identification badge. In many 
cases they would probably be produced 
at the same time. 
Existing commercial solutions do not offer 
the right mix of open standards and low price. In 
fact many VPN solutions have a per node pricing 
model that is based on the assumption that 
remote locations are company branches. Thus, 
they have pricing structures that deal with tens or 
hundreds of nodes. Scaling them to networks 
with thousands of nodes produces outrageous 
prices. Thus, we decided to investigate an open 
source solution. The advantage of this approach 
is that it offers enormous potential for 
customization coupled with a low cost per node 
since there are no software licensing costs. 
3. The design of the VPN node 
Creating a system in-house has many pitfalls, 
mainly related to the fact that the platform 
design, implementation and support all have 
hidden costs that must be brought out into the 
open and accounted for. Just because a piece of 
software is free does not mean that its 
deployment in a production environment is 
without cost. 
A lot of attention has to be given to the 
integration, large scale production and 
maintenance of the nodes, in order that a usable 
system be achieved within the budget constraints 
of the project. 
The prime considerations in the design of the 
VPN node has been simplicity and security. In 
this section we will elaborate on these two issues 
and examine their impact on the design of the 
operating environment. We will also present the 
major elements that constitute the VPN station 
and discuss the various design decisions we had 
to make. 
3.1 Simplicity - Reliability 
We attempted to keep the complexity of the 
platform as low as possible for the following 
reasons: 
A complex design is difficult to verify 
and control. This implies that 
maintaining the security posture of the 
platform after its original roll-out will be 
dificult. 
Network administrators come and go. A 
non-standard platform such as the VPN 
node will have to be easy to master, 
otherwise new staff will not be able to 
support it. 
The VPN node is intended for 
production use. The administrators must 
have confidence in the platform, 
otherwise on every instance of a 
problem they will suspect the platform 
and thus waste time investigating the 
platform instead of investigating the 
problem. 
3.2 Operating System 
From the very beginning, the design team wanted 
a platform that could accommodate tools for 
remote monitoring and management. The 
requirement that the station should operate in 
residential environments, without a monitor, 
keyboard or mouse effectively disqualified all 
Windows platforms. From the available UNIX or 
UNIX-like systems we eventually chose 
OpenBSD 2.7 for the following reasons: 
Built-in support for the transport layer 
security protocols (IPsec) that offer 
secure communication channels between 
stations. Since these channels are 
created by the networking code in the 
kernel, the encryption is transparent to 
applications. Thus, programs such as 
rlogin that have no encryption facilities 
can take advantage of the built in 
security offered by IPsec without any 
modifications to the application code. 
Like other fiee UNIX clones, a large 
number of programs such as tcpdurnp, 
snmpd, ssh, etc. are either supported in 
the base release or can be easily ported. 
Good security. The designers of 
OpenBSD have paid a lot of attention to 
the security profile of the system, 
creating a robust environment that is 
resistant to security related attacks. In 
fact, on the OpenBSD web site 
(http://www. openbsd. org/goals. html) it 
is claimed that OpenBSD passes 
Ballista's (now called Cybercop Scanner 
by Network Associates, http://www.nai. 
com/products/securi~/cybercop~scan- 
ner) tests with flying colors. 
VPN data while the other is used for the 
management of the VPN node itself. By using 
3.3 lPsec separate IPsec connections we ensure that users 
IPsec is a suite of protocols [RFC1825] that cannot access the management information or be 
provide encryption, authentication and integrity in a position to contact other nodes through the 
, Network , 
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Figure 2. The IPSEC tunnel provides a secure connection between the two local area 
networks over the public Internet. 
checking at the network layer. The VPN employs 
IPsec in tunnel mode with encryption (ESP) 
[RFC1827] (figure 2). Tunneling consists of 
encrypting and encapsulating a normal IP packet 
within a IPsec packet (see figure 3) . Since both 
the header and payload of the original packet are 
encrypted, the internal structure of the private 
network is concealed &om intruders [Shah97]. 
The use of tunnel mode also allows us to use 
the VPN nodes as routers sending packets from 
the remote home LANs to the main corporate 
network [Scot98]. Under this scenario addresses 
from the internal corporate network may be 
VPN. 
3.4 Key Management 
Running IPsec with statically defmed SAs as we 
did in [Prev99], is like running the Internet with 
static routing tables. The resulting VPN is 
extremely inflexible and keys are not changed as 
often as they should because of the effort and 
disruption to service. Moreover, since SAs 
contain source and destination 1P addresses, they 
have to be changed each time the IP address of 
one of the endpoints changes. Users that connect 
to the Internet via dial-up connections or even 
Datagram wRh ESP In bmel 
mode 
Figure 3. lPsec using ESP in tunnel mode 
allocated to workstations at the employees' permanently connected users that are assigned IP 
homes. addresses via dhcp cannot use statically assigned 
SAs. 
Two sets of IPsec connections are 
maintained for each VPN node. One carries the 
Workarounds to the above problems exist 
and are discussed in detail in [Prev99]. However, 
these solutions lack elegance and are not suitable 
for large scale VPNs. 
Purchases via credit cards provide a good 
analogy to the problem of setting up Flexible 
SAs. When purchasing an item, the customer 
presents the merchant a credit card. The 
merchant does not need to keep a record of all 
the people that have a VISA card in order to 
complete the transaction. Instead, the merchant 
contacts the credit card company and gets an 
authorization. In essence the credit card company 
vouches for the customer. 
In the same way, one of the endpoints (A) of 
a VPN tunnel presents a certificate that is signed 
by a certification authority (CA) acceptable to 
the other side (B). There is no need for B to have 
previous knowledge of A since the certification 
authority vouches for the authenticity of (the 
certificate presented by) A. 
There are two differences with the credit 
card example. The first is that there is no on-line 
communication with the CA during the 
negotiation. Endpoint B has the public key of the 
CA and can thus verify the certificate presented 
by A. The second difference is that A does not 
trust B and so B must also present a certificate to 
A. The second certificate must be signed by a CA 
acceptable to A. In out system all certificates are 
signed by the same CA but this need not be the 
case. 
A serious issue with certificates is 
revocation, i.e. what happens if, for example, a 
VPN node is lost or stolen. Our system does not 
currently support certificate revocation but there 
are two mechanisms that can prevent 
compromised nodes from linking to the VPN. 
The first is that certificates have limited lifetimes 
and so, unless renewed, become worthless after a 
specified interval. The second is that, by chang- 
ing the policy file, we can prevent nodes from 
accepting connections from blacklisted nodes. 
3.5 Firewall 
VPN nodes must be able to allow traffic 
fkom the interior network to flow through the 
VPN to the other internal networks, while at the 
same time they should allow only a very 
restricted set of incoming connections. On the 
other hand, connections from other VPN nodes 
must be accepted. 
The VPN may be viewed as a transit 
network located between the end-user 
workstation and the internal network. 
In the VPN node design we have used the 
packet filtering functionality of the OpenBSD 
kernel with a configuration that imposed three 
classes of restrictions: 
public Internet ("outside" interface) 
All packets are blocked except IPsec 
packets, since IPsec has its own security 
mechanisms, and ICMP echo and reply 
messages but excluding the other ICMP 
control messages. 
Transit packets flowing through the 
VPN ("inside" interface). 
While allowing the packets to be routed 
though the VPN we generally do not 
allow connections to the VPN nodes 
themselves. Exceptions to this rule 
include services such as dhcp that are 
required for the operation of the node. 
We also allow through certain types of 
ICMP packets for network trouble- 
shooting. 
Traffic between the VPN nodes 
("inside" interface). 
This is mainly for management and 
node administration. Generally no 
restrictions are placed to this type of 
traffic. 
Given that we are enforcing no access 
restrictions within the VPN, we were extremely 
concerned about allowing access to the VPN 
nodes from workstations located at the users 
premises. When considering security mechanisms 
there is always a need to strike a balance between 
security and convenience. Making life difficult 
for the end users would only mean that they 
would avoid using the VPN or find ways to 
disable or bypass various security mechanisms, 
thus compromising the security posture of the 
entire network. At the same time we did not wish 
to allow unsophisticated users access to the VPN 
nodes. 
In the end we decided that users may access 
their local VPN node only fkom their own 
"inside" network. In this way only users suitably 
authorized would be able to access the 
configuration of their own VPN stations. 
3.6 RAM-based system of all the executables that we wish to be available 
In order to produce a simple and reliable system 
we decided to dispense with the hard disk. The 
reason behind this decision was twofold: 
reliability and support. Although disk drives tend 
to be reliable, they would have to operate 
continuously throughout the life of the VPN 
at runtime in a single executable using the 
cruchgen utility [Silv98]. The single executable 
alters its behavior depending on the name under 
which it is run (argv [ O ] ) .  By linking this 
executable to the names of the individual utilities 
we can create a fully functional /stand directory. 
nodes. In a residential environment equipment The aggregation of the system executables in 
tend to be subject to all kinds of abuse (knocked a single file and the compression of the entire 
about, powered down without shutting down the kernel allows a large number of facilities to be 
system, relocated while in operation, etc.). Hard made available despite the small size o f  the boot 
disks produce a fair amount of heat and noise and medium. For example in the VPN node 
are also more prone to failure in these conditions. distribution we have decided to include the 
following commands: 
The second and more important reason was 
related to the way that these machines were 
intended to be used. For our purposes, hard disks 
are already huge in terms of capacity and are 
getting bigger all the time. This free space can 
cause all kinds of trouble; for example, it may be 
tempting to fill it with data that should not be 
stored in the VPN node in the first place. This 
means that stations can no longer be redeployed 
easily because this information must be backed 
up, or processed. Secondly, if a station is 
compromised, the intruders will be able to use 
this space as a bridgehead, transferring and 
installing tools that will enable them to attack 
other network assets. 
On the other hand, diskless machines bring 
with them a whole collection of problems and 
administrative headaches. They are also basically 
incompatible with our objective of using 
standalone machines with encrypted tunnels for 
all communications over the public Internet. 
Instead, we use a RAM-based system where 
the software is loaded once during boot and then 
the system runs entirely on the system main 
memory (RAM). The boot medium may be 
floppy, CDROM, or a solid state disk (e.g. 
Compact Flash). In the following paragraphs we 
use the term floppy but the other media can be 
used just as well. In fact, in our prototype system, 
we are using Compact Flash as the boot medium. 
In order to produce a RAM-based system, 
we adopted the techniques used by the PICOBSD 
project which is a collection of FreeBSD 
configurations that can be accommodated within 
a single boot floppy (http://www..fieebsd.org/ 
-picobsd). The PICOBSD project provides 
configurations for a dial-up router, dial-in router 
(ISP access server), general purpose router and 
firewall. The PICOBSD technique links the code 
The root of the runtime file system, together 
with the executable and associated links, are 
placed in a ramdisk that is stored within the 
kernel binary. The kernel is then compressed 
(using gzip) and placed on a bootable floppy. 
Administration ate, dmesg, hostname, 
asswd, ps, reboot, update, 
dev -mkdb, mknod, pwd-mkdb, 
getty, inetd, init, login, 
snmpd, syslogd, telnetd, 
wicontrol, dhclient 
floppy root 
Filesystem 
etc stand var 
mount, (cd9660, fdesc, ffs, 
kernfs, mfs, msdos, nfs, 
procfs), df, newfs, umount 
- ,  
mfs.rc executables 
Figure 4. The organization of the floppy-based distribution 
This floppy also contains the /etc directory of the 
running system in uncompressed form to allow 
easy configuration of the runtime parameters 
(Figure 4). 
At boot time, the kernel is copied from the 
floppy disk to main memory, uncompressed and 
executed. The file system root is then located in 
the rarndisk. The floppy disk is mounted and the 
/etc directory copied to the ramdisk. At this point 
the floppy is unmounted and may be removed. 
The system is running entirely off the ramdisk 
and goes "multi-user" running the /etc/rc* scripts. 
Once the boot process is complete, user logins 
from the console or the network may occur. The 
floppy is usually write-protected so changes in 
the system configuration do not survive reboots. 
If, however, the floppy disk is not write 
protected, there exists a utility that can copy the 
contents of the ramdisk /etc directory to the 
floppy, thus making the running configuration, 
permanent. 
This organization places the files that are 
unlikely to change between VPN nodes in the 
kernel where they are compressed, while leaving 
the configuration files in the /etc directory on the 
floppy. Thus, these files can be easily accessed 
and modified. Moreover, a single diskette image 
4. Prototype network 
The VPN nodes described in this paper have 
been used to create the network shown in Figure 
5 linking research teams from various locations 
to the internal network of the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Even in academic environments where the 
security restrictions imposed by firewalls are 
relatively lax, there is a need for the provision of 
full connectivity between collaborating 
researchers. When the VPN is running, 
workstations in the three workgroups are able to 
communicate using the full suite of IP protocols 
(such as X 1 1, NFS, telnet, rsh, rlogin). 
As it can be seen in Figure 5, each of the 
three locations is linked to the other two via 
IPsec tunnels. This means that there is no need 
for additional routing tables since all the 
networks in the VPN are just one (virtual) hop 
from each other. 
By write-protecting the distribution medium 
we ensure that its configuration cannot be altered. 
Of course the running configuration can be 
altered since all the files exist on the ramdisk (for 
example, we can create new accounts, add IPsec 
SAs etc.) but when the machine is rebooted, it 
Ion Workstation VPN Node 
- - - I - - - - -  
' * * 4:::s Remote Location 
Remote Location 
Network 
Access 
with wireless Ethernet 
Device 
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Figure 5. VPN nodes link the LANs of the three participating institutions. 
may be produced and the configuration of each will revert to the original configuration on the 
station applied to it just before it is copied to the boot medium. 
floppy. Merging workgroups from different 
networks implies dealing with such issues as 
whether the guests should be allowed access to 
the rest of the internal network as if they were 
local users, or whether the workgroup networks 
should be located outside the firewall (maybe in a 
special DMZ). Another similar issue is whether 
local researchers should be able to link their 
usual workstations to the VPN or whether they 
should be required to use dedicated workstations. 
In situations where the VPN is linking 
researchers from, e.g., different companies, these 
issues would need to be seriously considered and 
the effect on the corporate security policy 
investigated before establishing the VPN 
[Ches94]. In our case convenience was 
considered more important than security and the 
VPN workstations were placed in the internal 
network. However, since the routes via the IPsec 
tunnels were not advertised internally, only the 
workstations in the VPN could communicate via 
the IPsec tunnels. 
power requirements and, most importantly, the 
noise from the power supply fan, make such 
machines totally unsuitable for deployment in the 
field. 
Single board computers (SBCs) allow the 
creation of small-factor convection-cooled 
systems. These designs are mostly compatible 
with the PC motherboards and cards so that there 
is no need for s o h a r e  porting. Moreover, solid 
state storage in the form of Flash RAM may be 
added thus improving the reliability of the 
system. 
After looking at a number of products we 
chose the NetCARD system by Cell Computing 
(see figure 6). This single board computer is 
about 14cm by lOcm and combines on board 
Ethernet interface, Compact Flash and 2 PC- 
CARD slots along with the usual PC-style 
interfaces (floppy, IDE disk, etc.). We used this 
I 011 00 
Etherne 
Figure 6. The VPN node hardware. 
4.1 Hardware Platform 
The VPN software runs on standard PC 
hardware. While most of the development was 
carried out on decommissioned PCs, the size, 
system both with a floppy boot medium and with 
a Compact Flash. The on-board Ethernet 
interface was used to connect the VPN node to 
the network access device, while an Ethernet PC- 
CARD provided the inside-network connection. 
We used the Lucent Orinoco PC-CARD that be powered down without the need for a 
provides wireless Ethernet, so that there was no shutdown procedure (e.g. sync). 
need for fixed wiring or hubs. We feel that 
deployment at home would make the use of such 5. Conclusions - Future Plans 
wireless devices a must. 
The work presented in this paper is a 
continuation of the work described in [Prev99]. 
4.2 Operation 
M.hl owka IAN 
Node 
VPN 
Nod* 
smch Oms IAN 
--- 
Branch O1Tm IAN 
Figure 7. The VPN nodes link remote locations to the central oftice over a 
public network. 
As soon as power is applied and the power-on 
tests are complete the PC BIOS loads the system 
fiom the boot medium and hands control over to 
the OpenBSD kernel. In order for the outside 
interface to be configured, the VPN node must 
find out the IP address provided by the ISP. If the 
IP address is always the same, then it can be 
included in the static configuration that is read 
off the boot medium. Otherwise the system uses 
dhc l i en t  to configure its interface. The inside 
Ethernet interface uses a pre-assigned address 
fiom the private internet range (RFC1918). The 
system also runs dhcpd on the inside interface 
so that workstations on the private network can 
be auto-configured. The system then runs the 
i s a k m p d  daemon that creates the Security 
Associations and sets up the IPSEC tunnels. The 
packet filtering software ensures that the VPN is 
isolated from the outside world. The node may 
In the previous project a number of VPN stations 
were deployed within the University of Piraeus as 
part of a network of monitoring stations. The 
purpose of these Secure Network Stations (SNS) 
was to allow the creation of a secure network that 
allows administrators to manage and troubleshoot 
network elements such as routers, hubs, and 
switches deployed throughout the University 
campus. The SNS system has been in operation 
for more than a year. 
The SNS nodes have different configurations 
from the VPN nodes discussed in this paper 
because they serve different roles. For example, 
SNS nodes need to forward SNMP traff~c fiom 
the network elements and allow connections from 
inside the secure network to reach network 
elements located outside the SNS perimeter. 
Moreover, the system uses static SAs with 
manual keying which necessitates the production 
and distribution of updated configurations on a 
regular basis. 
Nevertheless, the experience gained from 
their use helped in refining the requirements for 
the systems described in this paper. One notable 
decision that was directly influenced by the 
previous design was to have a fully connected 
mesh of IPsec tunnels linking every node to all 
the others. Most VPN solutions tend to link a 
central office with a number of remote locations 
with the IPsec tunnels arranged in a star (see 
Figure 7). 
The many-to-many links allow the VPN to 
be resilient to failures of individual nodes and in 
the case where there is significant traffic between 
the remote nodes there is better utilization of the 
VPN resources as all packets go through at most 
one IPsec tunnel to their destination. 
Another system that offers similar 
functionality to the one we have presented here is 
the Moat from the AT&T Labs [Denk99]. Like 
our system, the Moat also utilizes small single 
board computers running a lightweight version of 
Linux and create VPNs allowing AT&T research 
personnel to telecornmute. The Moat follows the 
one-to-many VPN layout probably because it is 
not envisaged that there will be significant traffic 
between employees working at home. Remote 
stations with floating IP addresses (as is the case 
of most dial-up Internet connections) are treated 
by dynamically rewriting the IPsec configuration 
files. This requires that a central cite is always 
operational so that the VPN nodes can get the 
information they need to create their 
configuration files. In our system, the use of 
certificates, allows any two stations to negotiate 
SAs and create IPSEC tunnels. Additionally, the 
use of built-in facilities such as the isakmpd 
daemon make the system easier to maintain and 
port across Operating System releases. 
In the following paragraphs we will discuss 
other enhancements that we plan to integrate in 
the near future. 
5.1 VPN and non-VPN PCs on the home 
network 
Internet connections at home are seldom used by 
only one person or for only one task (e.g. work). 
By placing the VPN-node between the home 
network and the ISP connection we are 
effectively forcing everybody to go though the 
company network. This is not entirely without 
merit because it means that the home computers 
are shielded behind the company firewall. 
However, there may be cases where we wish to 
have access to sites or services that are blocked 
by the company firewall. In such cases it would 
be a good idea to be able to allow only certain 
PCs or network segments to belong to the VPN, 
while the rest would work as if they were directly 
connected to the ISP. 
There are three possibilities that we are 
currently investigating. The first is to plug the 
non-VPN PCs directly to the ISP feed. This 
allows us to have the non-VPN PCs behave as if 
the VPN did not exist. However, in this case the 
non-VPN PCs are exposed to attacks emanating 
from the public Internet. 
Moreover, if the ISP allows the user to have 
more then one IP address per connection this 
setup can be straightforward. If, however, we 
have only one address, then we need some piece 
of equipment to do network address translation 
(NAT). Since we already have a powerful router 
as part of our VPN-node we may as well use it 
for this task as well. To be able to perform NAT 
we would need another network interface. This 
may be either in the form a separate Ethernet 
card or as a logical interface on the outside 
Ethernet card. The extra card solution allows us 
to do some packet filtering as well, so it offers 
the possibility of increased security. 
5.2 Routing versus Bridgirlg 
Currently VPNs are created by joining separate 
networks via tunnels. Packets destined for a non- 
local network in the VPN are routed through one 
or more IPsec tunnels. While this may seen 
adequate for most practical purposes, the 
existence of the tunnels is visible, since they exist 
in the IP layer. This implies that routing tables 
must be employed (and hence software like 
routed or gated to manage those tables) to 
determine how the packets will be shuttled fiom 
one location to the next. However, if the tunnels 
are placed below the IP layer, then we can create 
a virtual LAN linking all the stations in the VPN. 
In this case all the workstations will belong to 
same IP network and behave as if they were 
connected to same Ethernet segment. 
This behavior can be accomplished by 
configuring the VPN nodes as bridges rather than 
routers. The integration of IPSEC with bridging 
is already present in OpenBSD [KeroOO] and we 
are currently working in the integration of these 
mechanisms in the VPN-node framework. 
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